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ABSTRACT 
This  paper both documents the  involvement  of developing 
countries in coalitional activity in the current GATT Uruguay 
round thus far,  and provides a rudimenting evaluation of the pros 
and cons of the different options for them as far as coalitiorial 
strategies are concerned.  The main conclusions  are  that  much of 
the coalitional activity involving  developing countries  thus far 
in the round has been agenda—moving  and joint proposal-making, 
rather than negotiating involving  exchanges  of concession.  At 
the same time,  however,  coalitional activity by a larger group of 
mid-sized developed and smaller  developing countries  who see a 
major interest in preserving the multilateral system has been 
central  to the process. 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
This paper both documents the involvement of developing 
countries in coalitional activity in the current  .GATT Uruguay 
round thus far,  and provides a rudimenting evaluation of the  pros 
and cons  of the different options for them as far as coalitional 
strategies are concerned.  Coalitionai activity in this  trade 
round,  unlike earlier rounds,  has been marked and,  especially the 
mid-sized  market oriented, developing countries have been 
centrally involved.  There has been consIderable  discussion as to 
whether small  group coalitions offer developing countries more 
ocrtnities for dealing with theIr  access problems in trade 
negotiations compared to a go—it—alone country—by—country 
approach, or a bloc—wide (377)  strategy.  This  paper is an 
attempt to deal  with these issues. 
Since there is little or no meaningful economic theory on 
which to draw in evaluatIng coalltional options in trade 
negotiations, the approach taken here is largely inductive.3  A 
profile of experience thus  far  is assembled, and generalizations 
and evaluations offered from this. 
Our main conclusions are that much of the coalitional 
activity involving developing countries  thus far in the round has 
been agenda—moving and joint proposal—making, rather than 
negotiating involving exchanges of concession.  At the sane time, 
3 See  :ec'ent  theoretical papers by inmore  (1985)  and 
others.  Several of these try  to develop an axiomatic approach to 
ooalitional activity, but are so far removed from actual trade 
negotiations as to be of lIttle help. however,  coalitional activity by a larger  group of mid—sized 
developed  and smaller developing  countries who see a major 
interest in preserving the multilateral  system has been central 
to the  process. 
In the paper,  we argue that  agenda—moving and proposal— 
making coalitions seem much easier  to form and maintain than 
negotiatidg coalitions.  It  is,  therefore an open question as  to 
how much further  scope there is for coalitional actitity by 
developing countries in the later phases of  the  round.  As  it- 
accelerates towards its negotiations  phase,  we see an important 
role for  the larger coalition  of both smaller developed  and 
middle—sized developing countries  whose main concern is over  the 
erosion of multilateral disciplines under the O-Afl system. 
Issue—specific  coaliti.ons either exclusively involving  developing 
countries,  or involving  both developed and developing countries 
we see  as more problematic and ultimately unstable. 
Whether all  of this  upsurge of coalitional activity in trade 
negotiations represents an improvement  for developing countries 
we also  see as an open question.  On the one hand,  issue—specific 
small group coalitions offer  individual developing countries  the 
chance to pursue their narrower country interests and perhaps 
achieve more than if such coalitions did not form.  On the other 
hand,  a proliferation of small  group  -coalitions  weakens the grand 
coalition  of all developing countries,  which takes  a more 
systemic approach. 4 
II  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS AND COALITIONS 
Although  only  at its mid-stage, the current (eighth)  GATI 
round of trade negotiations has already made its mark by being 
different in nearly all ways from its predecessors.  It has an 
agenda which is dramatically  broader than previous rounds in 
covering such items  as services,  intellectual  property, 
agriculture,  textiles,  investment  and  others.  Thus in contrast 
to earlier rounds only small amounts of negotiating effort have 
thus far been devoted to tariff cutting. 
Also,  during its critical phases in early 1986,  the final 
launch of the round reflected a major and extremely  determined 
effort initiated  by smaller and middle—sized  developed countries 
(EFTA,  Canada,  Australia, New Zealand) in which a number of mid- 
size market-oriented developing countries (Columbia,  Venezuela, 
Uruguay, Zaire,  Indonesia, Thailand,  Malaysia) played a key role. 
These countries were jointly  concerned over  the implications  for 
the multilateral system should a round not be launched and they 
were successful in influencing events in a major way.  The 
direction of the round has also been significantly influenced by 
two important issue—specific  coalitions,  one  in agriculture (the 
"Cairns'  group of  14 developed and developing countries),  and  the 
other in services (involving  ten,  so—called "hardline", 
developing countries  opposed to the inclusion  of services in the 
trade round). 
Thus,  while still limited,  the participation of developing 
countries in the round has thus  far been both more active and 5 
more pluralateral  than in previous rounds  which,  defacto,  were 
largely EEC—US negotiations.  This  has  led to considerable 
discussion of both the merits of and  possibilities for 
coalitional activity in trade negotiations, especially as far  as 
smaller developing countries  are concerned (see Ostry,  1988) 
Why  has  an upsurge in this  type  of activity occurred now, 
and why  did  it not occur  in earlier rounds?  Is it for  real,  or 
will it begin to break down when the serious negotiating activity 
gets underway,  since what  has occurred thus  far  has largely 
involved agenda-moving  coalitional activity rather than 
coalitions which actually bargain via an exchange of concessions. 
And what of the interests of the middle—sized and smaller 
developing countries  who have been especially prominent in this 
activity.  Can  they be furthered  through this activity, or are 
these drawbacks to their participation in this  way? 
Country Objectives in Trade Necotiations 
The reasons why countries participate  in multilateral trade 
negotiations are many and varied.  Early GATT rounds were based 
on mercantilist bargaining,  with participating countries offering 
to bind or reduce tariffs protecting the home market in return 
for improvements  in access to foreign  markets.  But since those 
days,  the objectives that  countries  seek to achieve through GATT 
negotiations  have proliferated  and become many and varied. 
For some,  the use of an international  negotiation as a way 
of binding domestic policy is a  major objective; supposedly one 
of the major reasons, for instance, for Mexican accession to GATT 6 
in 1986.  For others,  the successive increase through recent 
rounds in the importance of rule  making as against bargaining on 
trade barriers has lead them  to concentrate  most on influencing 
the way rules  are written via the consensual GATT rule—making 
procedure.  There are also countries (such as Brazil and India, 
and to a lesser extent Canada,  Australia, New Zealand)  whose 
participation seems driven largely their search for a rule—based 
rather than  a power—based trading order.  Their concern is to 
prevent the erosion of multilateral disciplines agreed both in 
the GATT itself,  and in earlier rounds.  Countries  also have more 
distant motives, such as Japan's desire to keep multilateral 
negotiations  going,  since it helps in dealing with bilateral 
pressures from  the  US congress for market opening in Japan. 
Others are driven by concerns over  issues  which,  for  them, 
dominate all others being 'discussed in the GATT (such as 
Argentina on agriculture) 
.  And  finally,  there are countries  who, 
while remaining members of GATT,  participate little in 
negotiations  .4 
How and Why  Coalitions  Form 
Whether or not coalitions  form during GATT trade 
negotiations, and what these  coalitions try to do is a direct 
reflection of what the negotiations  are about, and how they are 
This is the case  for most of the African countries  who are 
GATT—contracting  parties.  Their perception seems to be that 
there is little of interest to them in a GATT trade  negotiation 
since commodity issues are not  covered.  At  the same time,  they 
have no incentive to give up contracting party membership of 
GATT,  since this could involve eventual loss of MFN benefits. conducted.  Because the process of negotiation in the GATT is 
sequential,  involving  first an agreement  on an agenda of issues 
to be negotiated  upon,  followed by the tabling of proposals 
around the agreed agenda issues,  with subsequent negotiation 
based on these  proposals, the process inevitably  generates 
several different  types of coalitions. 
At one  level  there  is pernanent and ongoing coalitional 
activity in the GATT.  At present there are 96 GATT contracting 
parties and 30 or so other countries  with de facto  GATT 
nembership, and country delegations are continually in touch one 
with another.  This nay be over  seemingly  minor procedural issues 
(such  as who chairs  a meeting,  nr when meetings are held)  /  or 
more major matters such as the rossible joint  tabling of a paper, 
or how to react  to a proposal. 
Delegations seem to talk to or contact the sane delegations 
repeatedly,  and  as they jointly discuss  various issues closeness 
of position on a range of issues develops.  These may  be groups 
of African countries,  discussing sinilar problems; India and 
Brazil with their  joint  systemic concerns;  Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore with their concerns over market access for 
manufacturers; or Australia, New Zealand and Canada with their 
agricultural interests.  There are also more formalized  groupings 
of countries,  such as the ASEAN countries  who are currently try 
to  coordinate their  positions on issues discussed in GATT working 
groups through regular inter—country meetings at trade officer 
level.  The  most  tightly discipined  of all these groups is the a 
12—member  European Community, which,  while represented through a 
single delegation,  spends much of its  time  trying to resolve 
differences among member states on issues being discussed. 
Types of Coalitions in Trade  Negotiations 
Defining coalitions in GATT trade negotiations is therefore 
difficult.  We will,  for convenience  as much as precision, refer 
to a coalition as any group of decision makers participating in 
the negotiation who agree to act in concert to achieve a common 
end.5  This concept of a negotiating coalition differs from 
coalitional concepts used in other areas of economic analysis. 
The most widely used coalitional  concept,  in economic 
thecry,6 is that  of the blocking coalition, with an allocation in 
the core being defined as one which cannot be blocked by any 
subset of participants from  the grand coalition.  There is also 
the use of coalitions in voting theory.  They may try to b1occ 
nrcosals  made by rival groups in legislative processes, or more 
active coalitions or groups nay  try  to secure voting majorities 
for their own prooosals.  There is also work on coalitional 
activity (collusion)  between groups of firms  in the industrial 
organization area,  surprisingly,  however,  there is lIttle  or no 
economic theory which gives any  guide as to how or why coalitions 
are formed in trade negotiations, how they should behave to 
achieve their ends,  and who gains  or loses from them. 
Kahier and  Odell  (1988) define a coalition as "two  or more 
actors with shared interests  that  influence their bargaining 
behaviour toward other actors",  . :15. 
See Debreu and Scarf (1963). 9 
As a result,  it  is also unclear what form  of coalitional 
activity in trade  negotiations is in the interest of developing 
countries.  One can argue that with a snall group issue—specific 
ccalitional approach to trade negotiations, developing countries 
with access difficulties in certain  product areas  (such as 
Argentina  with agriculture) can  form  coalitions  with countries 
with similar interests, and have a better chance of inproving 
theirposition  compared to a go—it—alone  approach.  On the  other 
hand,  such activities serve to weaken the grand coalition of all 
developing countries (sffectively,  the  077 in UNCTAD)  which can 
defend and hopefully improve  the trade rules  which apply to then 
all,  such as those which currently  apply under the general 
heading of "special and differential"  treatment.7  What types at 
coalitional activity in trade negotiations  are good or bad for 
develoing countries are not clear a priori. 
Thus far,  in the 7ruguay Round,  coalitions have taken 
several different forms  .  Agenda—moving coalitions  have  involved 
groups  of countries who have shared a common desire that 
particular issues be either included  or excluded from the 
negotiations.  The advantages to developing countries from 
participating in these coalitions is fairly clear.  Issues in 
7 The GATT provisions comprising the special and 
differential treatment of developing countries  are 18(a) 
(covering  tariff renegotiations,  although these are not important 
because of the liberal nature of Article 28,  18(b)  (for Balance— 
of-Payments excetions,  as amended by a 1979 agreement), 13(c) 
(for  infant industries,  also reinterpreted in 1979),  and the 
Enabling Clause (1979)  for trade preferences.  Special arrange- 
ments for developing countries also apply under the CATT codes 
and regional arrangenents (Article  24). 10 
which they are interested can  be given a higher profile than if 
they try to promote them on their own.  These coalitions are 
relatively easy to form since the countries who join do not have 
to agree how they would make concessions  on other issues. 
With the agenda framed,  coalitions have also formed to make 
joint  proposals.  Jointly tabled proposals usually suggest either 
changes In existing trade barriers being discussed in one  of 
several negotiating groups,  approaches to rule makIng in new 
areas,  or set  out joint positions indIcating the conditions under 
which changes should be made.  Joint proposals have been a 
comnonly used coalitionaa tactic in this round in contrast to 
earlier rounds.8  Again, these coalitIons are relatively easy to 
form since no common set  of concessions  need to be agreed by 
members of the coalition. 
FInay,  there  are genuine negotiating coalitions.  Thus 
far,  the current trade round has not entered its final phases in 
whIch concessions are exchanged, and so the workability of these 
coalitions  has yet to be tested.  These are the most difficult to 
form and maintain.  This Is because,  unlike agenda—moving or 
proposal-making coalitions,  they Involve  two—sided agreements, 
8 During the Tokyo Round, some developing countries  proposed 
that they be able to negotiate jointly on issues of concern to 
them where indIvIdually  they were not principal suppliers of 
products.  The weakness of this  approach  was that,  when requested 
to make concessions, some countries In the coalition  were 
reluctant to do so or would not  go far enough to the taste of 
other coalition members.  This was because of concerns that 
problems could arise in subsequent renegotiations  under Article 
XXVIII of GATT  (re—tarfficatIon).  See GATT (1974),  o.  92. U 
since participants in the coalition  nust agree both on what  they 
want and what they are willing to give up. 
Issue—specific  negotiating coalitions  raise special 
difficulties.  Requests made by the coalition will  typically  be 
part of a set  of wider demands made by each country as part of 
the negotiations.  And since countries  typically  wish to balance 
their positions  across all the  issues  that are of interest to  it, 
they  need to reserve some degree of flexibility to allow for 
changes in position on various issues  as part of the negotiating 
processes.  Such changes  nay  well  be inconsistent  with agreenents 
that  countries  have entered into in order to join the coalition. 
These coalitions are,  therefore,  dIfficult to naintain.  They 
tend to be more resilient  where the issue at stake are of cajor 
importance to all  the members of the coalition (such as 
agriculture for most of the Cairns group countries) 
Other  difficulties also arise with negotiating coalitions, 
such as the need to use a common negotiator.  The single 
negotiator for the whole coalition  needs to have a reasonable 
degree of flexibility  to be able  to maneuver and respond to 
offers made by other parties.9  In short,  coalitions that jointly 
demand seem easy to form  amd can have an effect on the course of 
the negotiation.  Coalitions that  are forned to effect the 
The difficulties involved in negotiating  as a coalition 
are reflected  by the ways the European Economic Community 
participates in GATT negotiations.  Negotiations anong the member 
states on common positions and responses to requests are both 
time—consuming  and divisive,  and take as much if not more of 
their negotiating effort as dealing with non—EEC countries. 12 
outcome of bargaining are more difficult. 13 
III  COALITIONAL ACTIVITY AND THE LAXJNCH CF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
Coalitional activity in the Uruguay round involving 
developing countries  began as part of the process through which 
the round was launched, covering the period between the end of 
the Tokyo Round in 1979 and the Ministerial meeting in Punta del 
Este  in September 1986  which launched the round.  Because of the 
importance of these events  to understanding how coalitional 
activity in the present round has evolved,  in this section we 
document these events in some detail and draw some implications 
for developing countries and their involvement  in coalitions. 
November 1979  — October  1982 
At the end of the Tokyo Round in November 1979,  it was 
widely felt  that there was unfinished business left  over from the 
round,  particularly in the areas on safeguards and agriculture. 
There were also misgivings in some quarters about  certain 
features of the  Toicyo Round results particularly the MTN codes 
which introduced the  threat  of discrimination  through the 
application of conditional  MFN treatment. 
Also,  although special and differential treatment  for 
developing countries  had been given high profile in the 
negotiations, there was a feeling that  these provisions did not 
meet the needs of the developing countries  within the trading 
system.  Among the developing countries (and some smaller 
developed countries) there were misgivings that they had not been 
able to participate more fully in the negotiations, and that they 14 
had simply been presented with the results on a take  it or leave 
it basis. 
In the years immediately following the Tokyo Round, most of 
the activity in the GATT concentrated  on implementing  the tariff 
and non—tariff  barrier agreements from  the  round.  The sense that 
there was outstanding unfinished business created resistance in 
some quarters to the idea of considering fresh initiatives for 
trade liberalization.  At this  time,  these were coming mainly 
from  the  US. 
A proposal to hold a Contracting Party Session at 
Ministerial level  in November 1982 was somewhat reluctantly 
agreed to, amid differences in expectations among contracting 
parties as to what nigh result.  The Cnited States,  in 
articular,  wanted to tackle the unfinished business from  the 
Tokyo Round (safeguards  and agriculturs,  and to explore the 
introduction  of new  issues into the GATT (nc1uding  services, 
counterfeit  and high technology).  The  Ta'S  approached this meeting 
as an opportunity  to prepare the way for launching  a new round. 
However, the  EEC was clearly unwilling to contemplate trade 
negotiations  which included agriculture.  This made  i.t  dIfficult 
to seriously consider the launching  of a new round.  Developing 
countries remained concerned about the implementation  of special 
and differential treatment, and how the MTN  codes from the Tokyo 
sound were to operate. 15 
The November 1982 Ministerial 
The November 1982 Ministerial meeting was unprecedented for 
the  GATT.  This was the  first  time  that  such a complex agenda 
spanning such a wide variety and volume of  issues  had been agreed 
to.  It was also the  first  tine the Contracting Parties had gone 
into a meeting at such a high level without first agreeing in 
advance what the fundamentals  were on which discussion in the 
meeting should be based.  As a result,  meeting was less  than 
successful,  and many stumbling blocks proved too difficult to 
overcome. 
in safeguards, it was only possible to agree on an 
elaboration  of  the words used to describe the EEC—US deadlock in 
the Tokyo Round agreements,  because selectivity remained the 
central issue.  Secondly, the EEC renamed adamantly opposed to 
negotiations involving agriculture,  although importantly they di 
agree that a Conmittee on Trade in Agriculture  be established. 
The anbiguty  of the strength of comitnent  to the 
Standstill and Rollback in the Ministerial Declaration resulting 
from the meeting (the first tine  it had formally appeared) also 
created a good deal of acrimony.  The EEC  later  issued its own 
interpretation  of the declaration stating it was only a "best 
endeavours"  commitment.  The new issues  areas,  especially in 
services, also proved to be a major bone of contention for the 
developing countries, and specifically  for Srazil and India.  In 
the  end,  all that  could be agreed to was to exchange information. 16 
The 1982  Ministerial meeting was considered by all 
participating countries to have been a total failure.  What might 
have been the start of a process towards the launch of a new 
trade round ended up being a Work Program for  two years that  did 
not commit anyone to anything.  The Work Program proceeded during 
the two years after the  1982  Ministerial Meeting.  In some areas 
little progress was made,  while in other areas,  such as 
agriculture,  useful preparatory background  work was completed. 
Concern began to grow,  however, over what would follow now 
that  the Work Program  was coming to an end.  How was the momentum 
for trade discussions of interest to those countries concerned 
over  a possible future  further erosion of  the multilateral 
trading system to be maintained? 
November 1932  to January l96 
Early in 1984,  the Japanese joined with the Americans in 
calling for  a new trade  round,  and  by the  end  of  1934, all  the 
industrIal  countries were on board as far as a new round was 
concerned.  However,  large numbers of developing countries  were 
unconvinced  of  the justification  for  a new  round,  arguing that 
unfinished business of the Tokyo Round remained unresolved and 
was reflected in the policies being currently  pursued by the 
industrial  countries.  They also  were fearful of pressure being 
used against them  in the new  areas (services,  intellectual 
property, and trade—related investment),  and were concerned over 
an erosion of special and differential treatment.  Significant 17 
numbers of developing countries  thus continued  to oppose the 
launch of a new round up until mid—1985. 
Agreement to move further towards a launch  of a new round 
occurred in July 1985  but only after lengthy  and bitter 
discussions  The Preparatory Committee started its work in 
January of  1986 againSt a background of uncertainty and suspicion 
among the Contracting  Panes  as to where the process should and 
could lead.  There were  fundamental differences in opinion among 
delegations over the introduction  of new issuesinto  GATT 
negotiations, and over  the order of negotiating priorities. 
Because of these  differences,  the  CATT  Secretariat  was unable to 
even draft a declaration for discussion.  This  stalemate over how 
to reach a draft of a declaration for  the launching  of the round 
provided the ccnditions for subsets of normally minor players to 
act as catalysts to keep events moving.  The drafting of the 
declaration became an exercise in coalitional  activity,  and 
through this  the round  was launched. 
The EFTA Process and the 910  in Early 1986 
Around May 1986,  two declarations  emerged from  different 
groups of contracting parties.  One came from a group of ten 
developing countries (the 910),  lead by  Brazil and India.  This 
document proposed a narrow set of  issues  for negotiation and 
established  a number of conditions to be fulfilled  before 
negotiations  could be launched.  This  document was perceived by 
others outside the group as a way of blocking negotiations, or at 
least  slowing down the process. 18 
At approximately the same tine,  six EFTA countries, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (G9) put forward their own draft 
declaration, and subsequently invited  some developing countries 
to a joint meeting in the EFTA Secretariat  building in Geneva to 
explore common ground.  The early meetings of this  group involved 
20 developing countries,  but as the process unfolded, this  group 
grew to nearly 50 countries.  These meetings were exceptional 
compared to previous rounds since the activities of this  group 
took place during summer,  outside of the  GATT,  and independent  of 
the work of the ?rearatory  Committee.  The US,  EC and Japan were 
kent  outside of  the process in the  IPTA building, although they 
were consulted and were broadly supportive of what  was going on. 
The GlO also  continued to meet and seek ways of refining their 
prooosed declaration,  hut were unsuccessful n  attracting broader 
suoport. 
As  the  date  for  the Ministerial  'ieeting approached,  it 
became increasingly  clear that  agreement  on a single text  for 
Ministerial approval was  not going to be possible.  Argentina, 
fearing implications  for  its agricultural interests in the round 
proposed a third draft  which it hoped would bridge the  gap 
between what had now become a solidly supported Swiss-Colombia 
proposal from the EFTA process and the GlO text.  The Chairnan of 
the Preparatory Committee forwarded  these three texts of a 
possible declaration to the Ministers at Punta del  Este. 
However,  the effort on the third text came  too  late and was not 
given serious consideration. 19 
Events  at Punta del Este 
Early on in the week of meetings at Punta del Este,  separate 
groups were established tb address agrioulture (on which there 
had  been no agreement in the Swiss—Colombia  text)  and services. 
Meanwhile, the Chairman of  the Ministerial Meeting formed a 
heads—of-delegations  group,  which went through  the various issues 
for negotiation.  Mid-way through the week the Chairman convened 
a small group of approximately 20 ministers to hopefully break 
the deadlock over the three draft  declarations.  After 
acrimonious exchanges of views within this  group,  it was  finally 
agreed that  the Swiss—Colombia text was to form  the basis for 
negotiation of the  final  declaration.  During the next two  days: 
Brazil,  India  and other members of the 010  issued  a range of 
Dr000sed amendmemts to the Swiss—Colombia  text,  but were again 
unsuccessful. 
The groups in services and agriculture continued to meet,  as 
did the Chairman's heads-of-delegations  group.  Services was the 
first issue settled when they managed to agree on a text which 
emphasized institutional separation,  growth and development to be 
given priority,  amd national sovereignty  to be respected in any 
negotiations.  The text  on agriculture  was agreed next,  followed 
by trade  related intellectual property and trade—related 
investment.  Despite some last minute manoeuvreing by the BC over 
the issue of how amy balance—of-benefits  in the subsequent 
negotiation was to be evaluated, the declaration  was adopted in 
the Plenary meeting of the following  day. 20 
Coalitional activity was thus  central to the launch of the 
round,  and a successful launch would likely not have occurred 
without It.  Issue—specific  coalitions on agriculture and 
services (discussed below)  were equally important in shaping the 
agenda for  the  round,  and In framing the resulting declaration. 
Thus  far,  the round that has followed has been more pluralistic 
with wIder participation from developing countries than in any 
previous round and with a larger focus  on coalitional activity as 
a way of achieving country objectives.  All  of  this  is,  in part, 
a reflection of the way the round was launched. 21 
IV  THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,  AND HOW  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES SEE THEIR INTERESTS 
Relative to the fSur—year  timetable suggested in the Punta 
del Este declaration,  the Uruguay Round is now approachingits 
intermediate  stage.  The structure of the round involves fourteen 
negotiating groups on goods trade issues and a group on services. 
A mid-course ministerial meeting is due  to be held in Montreal in 
December, 1988. 
Table 1 lists the various negotiating groups in the  round, 
and indicates  the central issues  of  interest to developing 
ccuntries.  Among the  first  four groups,  commonly referred to as 
the access groups, tariff negotiations nay eventually taks  place 
on a request and offer basis,  not on a general formula cut  basis 
as was the  case  for many tariff cuts in the Kennedy and Tocyo 
Rounds.  While tariffs  are low  in developed countries,  tariff 
escalation facing developing country exports remains an issue. 
The possible  use of tariff bindings as a way of extracting 
concessions  in other groups nay be an option for some developing 
countries  to consider. 
In the non—tariff  measures group,  the main issue for 
developing countries is how to bring unjustified quantitative 
restrictions more fully under the  system.  Their concern will be 
to do this  in ways which do not limit  their own use of 
quantitative restrictions.  The natural resources  group also 
raises tariff escalation issues,  and offers interesting 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































countries who  are both exporters of resource products (Canada and 
Chile on copper,  for instance) 
The fifth group, agriculture, is probably the key to the 
round, and the European position is probably central to what 
happens in agriculture.  The two issues likely to be dealt with 
here are domestic subsidies and export subsidies.  Both the US 
and  the Cairns group (covering  14 developed and developing 
countries) have concrete liberalization  proposals.  However, the 
impression conveyed by the current European proposal is that,  in 
the long run,  a market-sharing arrangement limiting the budget 
costs of agriculture is what  is sought. 
This  need not significantly liberalize agricultural trade, 
and  could be disadvantageous for develoing country agricultural 
exporters (and particularly potential new exporters in the 
future)  who could be effectively excluded from  shared trade.  And 
for the developing countries who are agrIcultural importers, 
there could be higher prices rather than  benefits from 
agricultural subsidies.  And if little  happens between the  US, 
the EEC,  the other agricultural exporters, and Japan on 
agriculture, the sense seems to be that it makes  it more 
difficult for anything of substance to happen in other 
negotiating groups. 
In tropical products, •the central issues are again tariff 
escalation, coverage, and the linkage to agricultural 
negoUations,  although there are also health, sanitary and 
seasonal restrictions faced by developing countries.  Tropical 27 
products is one of the main areas in which the Punta del Este 
declaration indicated hopes for quick progress.10 
In the GATT articles group,  a large number of articles have 
already been discussed and may become subject to negotiation. 
Perhaps the most important from a developing country point of 
view  is Article 18(b)  dealing with balance—of—payments exceptions 
for the use  of quantitative restrictions.  Developing countries 
have, however, taken a substantial interest ifl a number of other 
areas including Articles 24, and 28. 
The MTN  agreements and arrangements  group is specifically 
focussed on the question of codes,  and  the anti—dumping, import 
licensing and technical barriers to trade codes  are among those 
that have received the most attention.  Particularly important 
here for developing countries, is the issue of restricted 
application of MTN  codes through the conditionality introduced in 
the Tokyo Round. 
The safeguards group nay well prove the most important area 
of negotiation for developing countries in the  round. 
Safeguards,  as is well known,  was deadlocked during the Tokyo 
Round on the issue selectivity, and developing countries are 
-  under pressure once again to allow selectivity.  They now, 
10 Tropical products is also an area where reciprocity could 
be an important issue.  The developed countries stressed prior to 
the round they had  gone as far  as they could unilaterally, and 
the time had  come for developing countries to reciprocate if 
further liberalization  was  to be achieved.  The EEC has included 
a provision requesting reciprocity in their proposal.  The  US has 
tied progress on tropical rcducts to progress in agriculture. 
The prospects for early results here appear less  optimistic than 
a year or six  months ago. 28 
however, have stronger offensive rather than defensive objectives 
in the safeguards area,  in the sense of achieving firmer 
disciplines over safeguards measures by developed countries. 
This,  in turn,  would hopefully make it more difficult for 
developed countries wishing to use voluntary export restraints 
against developing countries.  Some  commentators have gone so far 
as to argue that a possible deal between developed and developing 
countries on Articles 19 and 18(b)  might be feasible, given the 
importance of each of  these articles (in opposite directions) to 
the two groups of countries. 
The group on subsidies and countervailing  measures is 
important to developing countries because they have been one  of 
the major targets for countervailing duty actions since the 
completion of the Tokyo Round.'1  There are also questions of 
export subsidies, particularly in the context of agriculture and 
the wider definition of subsIdization under the subsidies code. 
The groups on intellectual property and investment are part 
of the "new areas' covered In the round;  the objectives being to 
bring intellectual property issues  into  the framework of the 
GATT,  and to also deal with trade—related investment measures 
within the GATT framework.  Developing countries are generally 
cautious about these two  areas.  They see them as threatening 
national sovereignty in the case of investment restrictions, and 
Abreu and Fritsch (988) note  the high percentage of 
affirmative CVD actions against developing country exporters in 
the industrialized countries of the US,  EEC,  Canada and Australia 
(see table 4, p.32). 29 
as forcing firmer national intellectual property rights in cases 
where they are users of intellectual property.  There is a strong 
feeling that  these issues are outside of the mandate of the  GATT, 
and that by bringing them in,  issues of longstanding concern to 
developing countries will be neglected.  There are also concerns 
that a broadening of the GATT in this way  will ultimately be used 
to put pressure on developing countries. 
In the dispute settlement area,  the main issues concern the 
enforcement of panel rulings and dispute settlement procedures 
covering grey areas.  Developing countries certainly have 
interests in this  area,  especially as  they would nct wish to be 
subjected to bilaterally negotiated disputes. 
The functioning of the  c-ATT system group also involves 
developing country interests  .  Here  the issues involve 
organizational links with the  fliT,  ministerial involvement in the 
decision—making in the  GATT,  and  a surveillance body in the GATT 
to enable monitoring of trade policies and practices of 
contracting parties.  The developing country concern is that an 
imbalance in obligations towards surveillance will  result and 
developed countries will be relatively less accountable. 
Finally, in the services area,  there are many wide—ranging 
issues, since this is the  most  ambitious of the various attempts 
to extend the GATT to cover new areas.  First, there are 
conceptual difficulties as to how to define services.  Then, 
there are major data problems.  There are also differences of 
coverage; developing countries want to discuss including labour 30 
mobility, which the developed countries insist is an immigration 
issue.  Developing country concerns, however, focus on national 
security and sovereignty, along with their economic concerns over 
protecting infant  service industries. 31 
V  ISSUE—SPECIFIC  COALITIONS IN THE TRADE ROUND 
There have been several examples thus far  of issue-specific 
coalitional activity in the  round.  These involve both coalitions 
formed prior to the launch at Punta del Este,  and coalitions of a 
proposal—making type which have energed subsequently.  Genuine 
negotiating coalitions have yet to form. 
Services 
In the services area,  10 developing countries12 led by India 
and Brazil consistently  argued against inclusion of services in 
the run up to  the launch of the  round.  For a variety of  reasons, 
they did not want to see services in the round.  At a ninimun, 
they wished to separate the discussion on services from 
discussion of goods,  so as  to weaken the  linkage  between the  two. 
They also wished to promote an all encompassing concept of 
special and  differential treatment including services, and argued 
that  the standstill and rollbacc tro'rision from the  1982 
Ministerial should be more firmly implemented before any further 
discussion of services occurred. 
The coalition initially consisted of Argentina, Brazil, 
India,  Egypt and Yugoslavia — the so—called "Gang  of Five".  It 
-  formed  in 1984  as the Work Program was coming to an end,  when it 
was clear new issues  were being given consideration without any 
progress having been achieved on unfinished business from the 
Tokyo Round.  At the time,  the group's main objective was to see 
12 The 010 consisted of Brazil,  India,  Egypt, Yugoslavia, 
Peru,  Nicaragua, Cuba,  Nigeria, Tanzania and Argentina (who 
subsequently tabled their own proposal) 32 
that commitnents made by developed countries in the 1982  - 
Ministerial  were fulfilled before new  commitments were 
undertaken.  The backlog issues,  such as agriculture, safeguards, 
the MFA and  other derogatioris from the GATT represented by grey 
area measures, had,  in their opinion, to addressed first. 
There was also a strongly held belief, especially by India 
that,  in and  of itself,  liberalization in services was not 
desirable, since developing countries needed strong infant 
industry protection for their service industries if they were to 
survive. 
Secause of the desire by the maoc developed countries for a 
genuine multilateral negotiatio  on services which would include 
all contracting parties to the  GATT,  and its further desire to 
maintain consensus in the GATT  Council, these  developin 
countries  were able to exercise sufficient leverage to have a 
two—stage negotiating process establishsd in the Round whils 
reporting tO a common trade negotiations committee.  The agenda- 
moving effort was  thus  partly successful.  Since Punta del Este, 
the coalition has  to a large degree disbanded andeach country 
has pursued its own interests. 
Agriculture 
In the agricultural area,  the concerns of agricultural 
exporters ifl the period immediately before Punta del Este led to 
further issue—specific coalitional acttvity.  It began with 
tlruguay initiating a meeting in Montevideo to discuss 
agricultural liberalization in early  9S  among Southern non- 33 
subsidizing countries, with Argentina, Brazil, Australia,  'New 
Zealand and Uruguay in attendance.  Their objective was to 
consolidate the views of countries and coordinate their efforts 
to defuse the subsidy war between the US and  the  EC.  A second 
meeting was held in Pattaya, Thailand in July,  at which time the 
group expanded to  include Chile,  Hungary,  Thailand and Canada. 
Australia took the lead role when it hosted the third 
meeting of agricultural exporters in Cairns,  Queensland, one 
nonth before the Punta del Este meeting.  Fourteen agricultural 
exporters were invited, 13  including  a number of smaller ASEAN 
countries, Canada, Brazil,  Argentina and Chile.  The United 
States, Japan and the EC were invited with observer status.  The 
Cairns Group,  as it has become know,  has become the  first  example 
of a concrete developed—developing  country coalition. 
The Cairns and Pattaya meetings served to dramatize the 
level  of concerns among agricultural exporters over the issue at 
agricultural access.  Participants in the coalition were able to 
heighten awareness over  the effects of the crisis in world 
agricultural trade,  which in their view had sharply reduced farm 
incomes, depressed export earnings, reduced their  capacity to 
-  import,  worsened their external debt servicing problems, reduced 
their development and growth possibilities and created social 
:3 The Cairns Group includes Australia, Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile,  Colombia,  Fiji,  Hungary,  Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay. 34 
and; in some  cases, political tensions.  14  Their main objective 
was to see that a clear and unequivocal commitment to 
liberalization in agriculture be included in any Ministerial 
Declaration which might emerge from Punta del  Este.  The pressure 
exerted by the Cairns group was one of  the factors which led the 
European COmmunity to agree in Punta del Este to an inclusion of 
discussions on agriculture in the trade round, over initial 
strong objections by France and Italy. 
Unlike in the services area since the launchiri  Punta del 
Este,  the Cairns group has continued to operate as a coalitional 
grouo.  It has,  for instance, made a group-wide negotiating 
proposal.  There have,  however, been differences within the 
group,  and it is widely acknowledged that the next stage of 
agricultural negotiations within the GATT will be a test  for  the 
group. 
Meet:ings in Bariochi,  Argentina in February 1968  and 
Budapest, Hovember 1968,  have been called to keep the group 
fOcussed on their common interest.  However, differences of view 
over the specifics of negotiations have threatened to fracture 
the coalition.  Their position has been made especially difficult 
-  by  the fact that the  US has  tied progress on tropical products to 
progress on their proposal for agricultural liberalization.  As 
there are a riuber of tropical product producers in the Cairns 
Group,  this has produced problems over differences between the 
See "Chairman's Summary of the Senior Officials Meeting 
of the non-subsidising Agricultural Producing Countries" 2217/66. 
Also see Toronto Globe and Mail,  86/07/26. 35 
Cairns and US approaches to  liberalization.15  It also apears 
that there has been outside pressure on some countries to weaken 
their views and thus undermine the cohesion of the group. 
A particularly divisive issue  has been that of calculating 
PSE5 (production subsidy equivalents).  Because Canada is a 
subsidizing country,  it tends to weaken the credibility of the 
coalition as a whole.  Thus,  while endorsing the Cairns 
agricultural proposal in the  GATT,  Canada has also tabled its own 
proposal for liberalization. 
Brazil also has voiced differing views on PSE5.  Some 
developing countries, led by BrazIl,  have argued strongly that 
the principle of special and differential treatment is of 
overriding importance to developing countries, and dominates 
their interests in agriculture, per se.  Brazil has therefore 
argued that  any negotiated agreements which have the effect of 
bringing agriculture more fully into  the GATT framework  must be 
achieved in ways which respect special and differential treatment 
for agriculture.  This position caused difficulties in developing 
a common proposal within the Cairns group with some of the 
developed countries, and especially Canada,  initially taking an 
-- opposite  line. 
The Cairns group,  like the services group,  has undoubtedly 
been successful in meeting its original agenda—moving objectives. 
It has,  however, also persisted as a proposal—making coalition. 
See Haas  (1980)  for  a discussion of how collaboratIve 
efforts in other areas often fall  apart over disagreements over 
the distribution of benefits. 36 
Nonetheless, the signs of fragmentation are there,  and it 
sustainability as a negotiating coalition is in d6ubt. 
Safeguards 
Safeguards deal with the conditions under which countries 
can use trade restrictions to limit import surges which cause or 
threaten material injury to domestic industries.  Article 19 of 
the GATT insists upon these measures being used in ways which are 
non—discriminatory, but makes no mention of degressivity or 
financial compensation. 
There has also been coalitiorial activity in the  safeguards 
area,  resulting in several joint proposals.  Pacific countries 
who,  in general,  have been the target for safeguards actions, 
want firmer discipline over the  use  of these measures. As a 
result,  a number of these countries, including South Korea,  Hong 
Kong and the ASEAN countries, have made proposals to more fully 
enshrine MN  arrangements foL'  safeguards and move towards 
degressivity.  As the commonality of the demand and the 
circumstances of  these countries is so strong,  this  may be an 
area where there is more hope for  the eventual emergence of an 
active negotiating coalition. 
Natural esources16 
In the natural resources area,  several joint proposal-type 
coalitions have also resulted.  A group of four  African countries 
(Senegal, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Zaire)  have submitted a 
1  Natural resources includes fishery and  forestry products 
and non—ferrous metals. 37 
proposal which emphasizes the need to liberalize trade inthese 
products, especially the elimination of barriers to processed and 
semi—processed products. 
Another group of resource exporters has been meeting 
informally for the past few years.  These include Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Chile,  Peru,  Colombia, Argentina, 
Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Zaire.  Its 
purpose is to discuss common interests  and maintain coordinated 
tactics, although has yet,  it does not meet at Ministerial level. 
emands by trading partners for access to supplies is a major 
concern,  and the group hopes that  by raising such issues as 
tariff escalation and market access in the appropriate 
negotiating groups, problems will be dealt with on a broad basIs, 
and  not sectorally.  As the group's choice of tactics are central 
to  their eventual impact,  they view it as  too early in the round 
to submit joint  proposals. 38 
VI  DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS  AND COALITIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE 
REMAINDER OF THE ROUND 
The  Uruguay Round was launched,  in part, due to the efforts 
of a coalition  of developed and developing countries who acted in 
concert immediately before and during the Ministerial meeting In 
Punta del Este in September 1986.  In the afterglow, the round 
was  hailed as the round of  coalitions.  As the mid—term review 
approaches in December, it may  be helpful to reflect on how 
coalitional activity has progressed, what the prospects are for 
the next  two years of negotiations, and whether this activity ia 
in the interests  of developIng countries. 
Thus  far,  there have clearly been some successful agenda— 
moving issue—specific coalitions.  Developing countries have 
played central roles in these,  such as Cairns in agriculture, and 
to a lesser extent the GO in services.  Some have been 
exclusively develoing country coalitions,  other have involved 
both developed and develoPing countries. 
As the round enters its negotiating stage,  our sense is 
there seems to be  less  prospect of blocking coalitions emerging 
especially as some of the more active developing countries have 
-  abandoned their previous systemic approach, and are submitting 
joint proposals with developed countries, or proposals on their 
own,  which they see as  advancing both their national interests 
and the process.  Nowhere is this  more evident than in the case 
of Argentina, once a member of the  GlO services coalition, who 
have recently tabled a paper in the group on services recognizing 39 
the need for liberalized trade in services in order to aclxieve 
growth and  development. 
There has also been unprecedented activity in this  round in 
the form of joint proposals by countries united by a common 
interest rather than a north—south ideology.  Despite this,  the 
prospects for true negotiating coalitions still seem to be 
limited.  Even members of the Cairns group emphasize that  their 
group was never meant to be a negotiating coalition, but  a 
coalition whose objective was to advance a common position with 
the goal of influencing rule—making. 
The major potential for coalitional activity involving 
developing countries to  influence  the outcome of  the round could 
rest with the "de la Pair' Group.17  This group meets regularly 
to explore for common ground among its members.  It seeks to  find 
ways to nake this a productive, successful round.  Their concerns 
are  not  issue—specific, but systemic.  These are the  small  and 
medium—sized countries that  have the most to lose if the 
multilateral system is weakened and the trading system operates 
more and more on a power basis rather than a rules basis.  Their 
common interest lies  in the preservation of  the multilateral 
- system,  and their objective to have a successful conclusion to 
the current round. 
17  So called because of where they meet for  lunch each 
month at the Motel de  la Paix in Geneva.  The group consists 
mainly of Canada,  Switzerland,  Sweden,  Australia, New Zealand, 
Colombia; South Korea,  Uruguay, Hungary, Zaire, Thailand, 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. 40 
Many of the participating countries Were central to the 
group who laid the groundwork launching the Ministerial 
Declaration for  the  round.  They were dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the Tokyo Round,  and recognized  -that individually they 
have little power to influence negotiations between larger 
powers.  Their unity comes,  in part,  from  their belief that 
joining together in a coalition provides more leverage.18 
Because much of  this  round is about rule—making and reviving 
the GATT as a major multilateral institution,  it is less centred 
on traditional bargaining involving tariff barriers.  As a 
result,  some potential for  coalitional activity by developing 
countries to influence the outcome remains. 
One issue is whether developed—developing country coalitions 
will become more common as  the round advances.  Such coalitions 
have already occurred in the agriculture area with the Cairns 
group, and nay evolve in other areas such as natural resources, 
safeguards, and dispute settlement.  While there are 
opportunities for developing countries in such coalitional 
activity, both the difficulties of seeing them  through as 
negotiating coalitions, and the problems of the limited number of 
issues where they can be used makes their widespread 
proliferation less likely.  There is also the additional 
difficulty that  expertise in these areas is often scarce, 
resources for travel and maintenance of delegations in Geneva are 
18 For the New Zealand view of the advantages of  coalitional 
activity, see Beeby (1986). 41 
limited, communications between representatives and national 
capitals are difficult, and knowledge, and even interest in 
multilateral trade issues by those in political and bureaucratic 
leadership positions and private sector interest groups is 
sparse. 
A lot remains on the agenda for this round,  including 
matters which are  of substantial interest to developing 
countries.  Coalitions have a role  to play,  in allowing 
developing countries to achieve their objectives, but as more of 
these form,  especially if they involve both developed and 
developing countries, the grand coalition of all developing 
countries which seeks to change the system is weakened.  Whether 
to use the system as it stands through small group coalitional 
activity, or to try to change the system using the larger group 
remains the  issue. 42 
VIII CCNCLtJOING COMMENTS 
This paper discusses coalitional activity involving 
developing countries in the present GATT trade round.  It draws 
distinctions between the various types of coalitions which now 
seen to be emerging, and suggests that although there has been 
substantial activity of this  form thus far,  most of it is of an 
agenda—moving or proposal—making type  rather than genuine 
negotiating activity. 
Negotiating coalitions are more difficult to form and 
maintain than  proposal-making coalitions because negotiating 
coalitions involve a two—sided agreement both of what the 
countries are willing to give up as well as what they want. 
Their Issue—specific  nature also makes It difficult for countries 
to  trade across issues.  The areas of services, agriculture, 
safeguards and natural resources are all di.cussed as examples of 
what is happening in the coalitional area. 
The paper is inconclusive as to whether such coalitions are 
good or bad  for developing countries.  On the  one  hand,  through 
then individual developing countries can pursue their interests 
in particular trade policy issues with better hope of success. 
- On  the other hand,  a series of small group issue—specific 
coalitions tends to weaken the grand coalition of all developing 
countries who  may  be pushing for wider systemic change 
advantageous to all members.  The net benefit to developing 
countries is thus uncertain. 43 
REFERENCES 
Abreu, M. and W. Fritsch (1988)  'Market Access to Manufactured 
Exports from Developing Countries:  Trends and Prospects" in 
Whalley (ed.)(1988). 
Beeby,  C.  (1986)  "Two Sides to Foreign Policy", New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.  36,  No.  3  (July—September),  p. 
8. 
Binrnore, K.  (1985)  "Bargaining and Coalitions" in A.E.  Roth  (ed. 
Game—Theoretic  Models of Bargaining.  New York:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
"Bright Sunshine with a Chill Wind", The Economist, Vol.  300,  No. 
7465 (September  27,  1986),  p.  73—74. 
"Chairman's Summary of  the Senior Officials Meeting of  the Non— 
Subsidizing Agricultural Producing Countries", 2217/86. 
Dam,  (.W.  (1970) The GATT:  Law and International Economic 
Organization.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
Debreu,  C. and H. Scarf (1963)  "A Limit Theorem on the Core of an 
conomy".  International Economic Review 4:  235—46. 
GATT (1974) Basic Instruments and Selected Documents:  20th 
Suoplement.  Geneva. 
Haas,  E.  (1980)  "Why Collaborate?  Issue Linkage and 
International Regimes", World Politics. 
Hansen,  R.D.  (1979)  Beyond the North—South Stalemate.  New York: 
Council  on Foreign Relations. 
Keohane and  Nye (1977)  Power and Interdependence:  World Politics 
in Transition.  Boston:  Little,  Brown and Co. 
Odell,  J. and  M. Kahler (1988)  "Developing Country Coalition— 
Building and International Trade Negotiations' in Whalley 
(1988). 
Ostry,  5.  (1987)  "Interdependence,  Vulnerability and 
Opportunity".  1987  Per Jacobsson Lecture.  Washington: 
International  Monetary Fund. 
Preeg, E.H.  (1970)  Traders and Diplomats:  An Analysis of the 
Kennedy Round of Negotiations Under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.  Washington:  Brockings Institution. 
Roth,A.E. (1985)(ed.)  Game Theoretic Models of 3argaining.  Tew 
York:  Cambridge University Press. 44 
"Rewriting  the GATT's rules for a game that has changed", The 
Economist, Vol.  300,  No.  7463 (September 13, 1986),  p.  63— 
69. 
Toronto Globe and Mail, 1986/07/26,  1986/08/27 3.18. 
Whalley, J.  (1988)  Rules,  Power and Credibility:  Thematic 
Studies from a Ford Foundation Project on Developing 
Countries and the Global Trading System.  London,  Ontario: 
CSIER Research Monograph. 
Winham, G.  (1986)  International Trade and the Tokyo Round 
Negotiation.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. 